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The literature on JIT production suggests a causal link between work-in-process inventoryand manufacturing productivity. Such a connection has been described in numerous case
studies but never tested statistically. This paper uses historical data for 52 Japanese
automotive companies to evaluate the inventory-productivity relationship. We find that firms
increased their productivity rank during periods of substantial inventory reduction. More
detailed tests suggest that inventory reductions stimulated gains in productivity: On average,
each 10% reduction in inventory led to about a 1% gain in labor productivity, with a lag of
about one year. Such effects were more immediate for Toyota affiliates, but undetectable for
close suppliers of Nissan. These findings imply that inventory reduction served as an
important driver of process improvement for many Japanese automotive companies, although
some firms emphasized other methods.
(Inventory; Productivity; Just-In-Time Manufacturing; Auto Industry; Japan; Empirical Study)
1. Introduction
In recent years manufacturing managers and aca-
demic researchers have dramatically changed their
view of work-in-process (WIP) inventories. These in-
ventories, held as a buffer between processing steps in
manufacturing plants, were once considered essential
for maintaining a steady production flow. But the
wide acceptance of “just-in-time” (JIT) production has
led to the contrary view that these inventories prevent
the discovery of problems on the shop floor and can
thus be detrimental to productivity. According to this
new perspective, inventory reductions expose defects
in the manufacturing process, forcing managers and
workers to eliminate (rather than accommodate)
sources of process variability.
Various authors have described causal mechanisms
linking inventory reduction to productivity growth
(e.g., Schonberger 1982, Hall 1983). Nevertheless,
many questions remain unanswered. Does inventory
reduction lead to productivity gains, or does it merely
serve as an indicator that process variability has been
reduced so that less buffer stock is required? And if
inventory reductions do stimulate productivity gains,
how quickly do the gains appear, and what is the
magnitude of effect?
Details of JIT implementation have been addressed
in numerous case studies, but there has been little
statistical analysis of the connection between work-in-
process inventory and manufacturing productivity.1
In this paper we investigate this connection using data
1 For case studies, see Monden (1981, 1983) and surveys by Im and
Lee (1989) and Voss and Robinson (1987).
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for 52 Japanese automotive assemblers and parts sup-
pliers over the period from 1965 to 1991.
We employ three different statistical approaches to
evaluate the nature and magnitude of linkage between
WIP inventory and productivity. First, we apply an
algorithm to the inventory data to identify periods of
substantial WIP reduction. During these periods, firms
are found to have (1) increased their productivity
rank, and (2) exhibited significantly higher rates of
productivity growth. Second, we use regression anal-
ysis to examine the correlation between inventory
levels and labor productivity. Third, we perform more
elaborate tests of the time structure of inventory-
productivity relationships. These tests show that WIP
reductions were followed on average by productivity
gains, with a typical lag of about one year. Significant
differences are observed, however, between “kei-
retsu” company groups. In general, the findings point
to a statistically significant link between WIP reduc-
tion and productivity growth for most companies in
our sample.
2. Theoretical Framework
The connections between work in process inventory
and factory productivity can be represented in a
causal link diagram, as shown in Figure 1. This
diagram illustrates the links between productivity, the
level of WIP, and the detection, analysis, and resolu-
tion of production problems.
Figure 1 makes a distinction between “actual” and
“required” WIP inventory. In any production line,
WIP is used to protect the production flow from the
variability and discontinuities of production. In gen-
eral, as variability rises and as discontinuities become
more pronounced, more WIP will be necessary to
achieve a certain level of output. The minimum
amount of WIP needed to guarantee the desired level
of output is what is called “required WIP inventory”
in the diagram. Depending on how the production
line is managed, actual WIP inventory will fall behind,
equal, or exceed the required level.
The diagram shows five important links, which can be
characterized as follows. If the gap between actual and
required WIP inventory is made small, the production
problems that create the need for buffer inventories
become visible (Link 1). Types of problems that may
surface include machine failures, defective production,
time-consuming machine setups, long transportation
distances, unbalanced lines, and lack of coordination.
Link 1 is often described by the “rocks in the water”
metaphor for JIT: The rocks on the bottom of the riverbed
(the production problems) are exposed by lowering the
water in the river (the amount of WIP inventory).
Once visible, these problems can be solved, which
will have a positive effect on productivity (Link 2).
How, if, and when this will happen depends on the
problem solving capabilities present in the factory.
Sakakibara et al. (1997) call these capabilities JIT
infrastructure. Once a problem surfaces, workers or
teams of workers need to determine the root cause of
the problem and design, test, and implement a solu-
tion. The problems that cause the need for WIP
inventory typically involve some type of production
waste. When this waste is removed, whether it is
waste of materials, worker time, or machine time,
productivity rises. In addition, the quality of the final
product may improve, which may enable the firm to
obtain higher prices or lower warranty costs.
The removal of production problems feeds back to
reduce the need for WIP inventory (Link 3), allowing
actual WIP to be adjusted downward (Link 4). To
achieve this reduction in a production line that is
controlled by kanban cards, some cards must be
removed from the system. In MRP-type systems, in-
ventories remain unchanged until the lead time esti-
mates and lot-sizes that are used as parameters are
reset to lower values. The lag between the reduction in
“required” WIP and the reduction in actual WIP will
depend on how tightly this link is managed.
The reduction of actual WIP lowers the costs of
inventory holding and related activities, thereby making
a further contribution to productivity (Link 5). In addi-
tion to savings of WIP inventories, buffer stocks of
finished goods can often be cut in response to improve-
ments in process reliability and shortened cycle time.
The causal link diagram in Figure 1 provides a
framework for understanding the statistical models
and for interpreting the results in this paper. Unfor-
tunately, the model implied by Figure 1 cannot be
estimated directly, as we lack data on the problem
solving processes within firms. Rather, it is necessary
to infer the linkages from time series observations of
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(actual) inventory and labor productivity across the
sample of automotive companies.
The strength of the links and the speed of response
may vary greatly across plants and firms. Manage-
ment methods differ, and effective problem solving
can occur in the factory without an initial stimulus
from inventory reduction (Link 1). Indeed, we hypoth-
esize that some firms rely on inventory reduction as a
driver for process improvement, while others utilize
different approaches. Cusumano (1985) contrasts the
inventory-driven system developed by Toyota with
the more conventional MRP system used by Nissan.2
In the present study we test whether the inventory-
productivity linkages represented in Figure 1 have
been significantly different, on average, between affil-
iates of Toyota and Nissan.
3. Data
The data sample includes a total of 52 Japanese
automotive companies, covering nearly all of the
Japanese assemblers and most of the largest parts
2 While Nissan adopted some features of JIT manufacturing, “even
in the early 1980s, Nissan differed from Toyota in several areas. It
did not employ a “pull” system . . . it produced in relatively large
lots . . . (and it) chose to rely more on automation and computers to
raise productivity than production-management techniques such as
a complete kanban system or the job-cycle rationalization measures
and rapid line speeds that Toyota employed.” (Cusumano 1985, p.
307.)
Figure 1 Causal Link Diagram
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producers. The historical time series is sufficient to
allow observation of the adoption of JIT methods,
which were introduced in Japan mostly from the late
1960s to the early 1980s.3
Firms in the sample can be subdivided as follows.
Eight are “core” assemblers that design, build, and sell
finished automobiles under their own name. Three are
“contract assemblers” that assemble automobiles as
subcontractors for the core assemblers. The remaining
41 companies are “first-tier” parts suppliers, i.e., firms
that supply parts directly to the assemblers. About
half of these suppliers maintain strong ties with either
Toyota or Nissan. We assigned suppliers to three
groups (“Toyota,” “Nissan,” and “others”) based the
breakdown of their sales to the assemblers and their
membership in “supplier associations” (Sako 1996).4
These assignments are similar to other group defini-
tions in the literature (e.g., Saxonhouse 1980, Dodwell
1990, Toyo Keizai 1991).
The data are from Japanese annual financial reports
covering the period from 1965 to 1991. The specific
data items used in this study are: total company sales,
value-added, total employment, fixed investment, and
work-in-process inventories. These data are reported
on a consistent basis by all publicly-traded manufac-
turing firms in Japan.5 The data on sales and value
added correspond to flows over the fiscal year, while
employment, investment, and inventories are mea-
sured as stocks at the end of the year.
Productivity Measure
Labor productivity, defined as real-value-added per
employee, is the productivity measure used in this
study. (Value-added equals the firm’s sales during the
fiscal year, minus the costs of purchased materials and
services.) For each firm and year, the productivity
measure was computed by first converting the firm’s
reported value-added into constant yen (based on the
Japanese wholesale price index for transport equip-
ment), and then dividing by the average of beginning-
and end-of-year employment. This yields real-value-
added per employee, a standard measure of labor
productivity.
Since the 1960s, Japanese automotive firms have
scored impressive gains in labor productivity. Never-
theless, the rate of productivity growth has been
diminishing over time.6 Table 1 gives summary
3 Details of the sample are described in Lieberman and Demeester
(1995) and Lieberman et al. (1995).
4 These associations, which are organized by the assemblers, serve
as mechanisms for information exchange and technology diffusion.
5 The specific data used in this study are from the Analysts’ Guide
published annually by the Daiwa Securities Corporation, with
supplementary detail for the 1965–1976 period obtained directly
from Daiwa Securities Corporation.
6 Fujimoto and Takeishi (1994) discuss some of the reasons for
declining productivity growth in the Japanese automotive sector.
Table 1 Historical Data on Labor Productivity*
Value Added per Employee
(Millions of 1980 yen)
Average Annual Percent
Change
1970 1980 1990 1970–80 1980–90
Core Assemblers
All core Assemblers (8) 3.7 7.9 12.0 7.9% 4.3%
Toyota 5.5 11.0 20.0 7.3% 6.1%
Nissan 4.5 9.3 12.7 7.6% 3.1%
Contract Assemblers (3) 3.5 7.0 11.8 7.2% 5.4%
Suppliers
Toyota Suppliers (11) 2.9 6.6 10.8 8.6% 5.1%
Nissan Suppliers (11) 2.7 6.0 9.7 8.6% 4.9%
Other Suppliers (19) 2.8 6.7 10.3 9.2% 4.4%
* Data are simple averages across sample companies within each of the groups shown. (Number
of firms in group listed in parentheses.)
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measures of labor productivity for assemblers and
suppliers over the period from 1970 to 1990. Toyota’s
productivity level has been consistently high; suppli-
ers to Toyota have also performed better than average,
although by a much smaller margin. Within the ranks
of both assemblers and suppliers, productivity varia-
tion has been substantial.
WIP Inventory
Our analysis of JIT focuses on reductions in each
firm’s work-in-process inventory. Table 2 documents
the substantial inventory reductions that have oc-
curred in the Japanese automotive sector since the
1960s.7 Most companies in the sample cut their WIP/
sales ratio by more than 50% during a period of
intense activity from the late 1960s to the early 1980s.
Table 2 shows that Toyota has operated with very lean
inventories, and key suppliers to Toyota have held
much less WIP than the “other” suppliers. However,
the Nissan suppliers in the sample have maintained
even lower average levels of WIP and a superior rate
of inventory reduction.
Fixed Capital Investment
Labor productivity normally increases with the
amount of fixed investment per worker. Differences in
capital intensity reflect basic differences in production
processes and managerial choices about the degree of
process automation. Much of the productivity growth
in Japanese manufacturing since World War II can be
attributed to rising investment per worker (Norswor-
thy and Malmquist 1981, Jorgenson and Kuroda 1992,
van Ark and Pilat 1993).
To control for the effect of capital investment on
labor productivity, we include a measure of tangible
fixed assets per employee in our regression tests.
Tangible fixed assets equals the depreciated value of
the firm’s property, plant, and equipment at the end of
each fiscal year. This accounting measure was ad-
justed for inflation and divided by the firm’s total
number of employees to give an estimate of total
investment per employee.
4. Periods of Substantial Inventory
Reduction
Our first approach to characterizing the connection
between WIP reduction and productivity growth is
based on the observation that, for most companies in
the sample, there was a well-defined period when
major inventory reductions occurred. To identify these
periods objectively, we applied a simple algorithm to
the inventory data. We then tested whether the peri-
ods of inventory reduction coincided with changes in
firms’ relative productivity growth and productivity
rank. This analysis was limited to parts suppliers to
avoid confounding the effects of inventory reduction
7 See Lieberman and Asaba (1997) for a comprehensive assessment
of these reductions and a comparison with inventory levels in the
United States.
Table 2 Historical Data on WIP/Sales*
WIP as % of Sales Percent Change
1970 1980 1990 1970–80 1980–90
Core Assemblers
All Core Assemblers (8) 3.5% 1.5% 1.4% 255.3% 211.8%
Toyota 0.9% 0.4% 0.5% 258.9% 39.9%
Nissan 1.9% 1.1% 1.4% 243.0% 25.4%
Contract Assemblers (3) 1.2% 0.9% 1.1% 227.2% 23.7%
Suppliers
Toyota Suppliers (11) 3.5% 1.7% 2.0% 251.7% 17.4%
Nissan Suppliers (11) 3.3% 1.6% 1.3% 252.9% 219.5%
Other Suppliers (19) 6.4% 3.4% 2.6% 247.2% 221.3%
* Data are simple averages across sample companies within each of the groups shown. (Number
of firms in group listed in parentheses.)
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with other productivity differentials related to firm
type.
The algorithm for identifying periods of substantial
WIP reduction was implemented as follows. For each
firm we prepared the time series on the ratio of WIP
inventory to sales. We then found the earliest year, if
any, where the WIP/sales ratio for each of the next six
years fell below a trajectory involving 4% annual
reduction, or more stringently, 8% annual reduction.
To establish the end of the period, we identified the
earliest year for which the WIP/sales ratio fell within
20% of the average ratio of the remaining years of
data. While these standards are arbitrary, the results
proved robust to alternative identification proce-
dures.8
Figure 2 shows the periods of substantial inventory
reduction that were identified by the algorithm. The
supplier companies are grouped to reflect their links
with the major assemblers. Within each group, the
earlier adopters are listed first. Among the core assem-
blers, Toyota, Honda, and Nissan began cutting in-
process inventories during the 1960s or earlier; the
smaller assemblers followed in the 1970s. Among the
supplier companies, those allied with Toyota tended
to start cutting inventories several years earlier than
most others. For six of the 52 companies, the algorithm
was not able to find a meaningful period and it was
clear on inspection that those companies did not
display a period of substantial WIP reduction.
For the parts suppliers, we used two methods to test
for differential productivity growth during the inven-
tory reduction periods. The first method utilizes an-
nual productivity rankings of the companies. The
second method involves analysis of relative produc-
tivity growth.
In the first method, we ranked all of the parts
suppliers in decreasing order of their labor productiv-
ity within each observation year. For the suppliers that
satisfied the criterion for significant inventory reduc-
tion, we recorded their productivity rank in the year
prior to the start of substantial WIP reduction and one
year after the end of this period.
Table 3 reports the results. Of the 41 suppliers in the
sample, 35 met the “4% criterion” for substantial
inventory reduction. Of these, 25 increased in produc-
tivity rank during their WIP reduction period, and 10
decreased in rank (significant at the .01 level). Results
are stronger using the more stringent criterion of 8%
WIP reduction per annum. This criterion was met by
33 suppliers, of which 26 increased in rank and seven
decreased (significant at the 0.001 level).
Table 3 also reports the analysis of relative produc-
tivity growth during periods of substantial inventory
reduction. In each observation year, we computed a
relative productivity growth rate for each firm by
subtracting the average productivity growth rate of
suppliers from the value shown for the company.
During periods of substantial inventory reduction,
firms exceeded the sample average by about 1.5% to
2.0% depending on the criterion used. These produc-
tivity growth differentials are highly significant statis-
tically.
5. Correlation Between Productivity
and Inventory Levels
Our second approach to assessing the inventory-
productivity link was to use regression analysis to
examine the correlation between labor productivity
and the level of WIP inventory. Given that we have
annual data for a cross section of companies (i.e.,
panel data), there are several ways that such a corre-
lation might be observed.
We first investigated whether a negative relation
between labor productivity and the WIP/sales ratio
could be identified when companies are compared
annually in cross-section, as demonstrated for the
major assemblers in Lieberman (1990). We found
strong correlations of this type for the core assemblers
in many observation years. For the parts suppliers,
however, the correlation was significant only in the
mid-1970s, when inventory levels varied dramatically
across the companies.
One explanation for these results is that the suppli-
ers are heterogeneous in their manufacturing pro-
cesses, so their “required” levels of WIP inventory
differ. This masks the inventory-productivity relation-
ship when viewed in simple cross-section across firms.
To control for heterogeneous WIP requirements, we
estimated a “fixed effects” regression model where the
8 There are no standard procedures for identifying the periods, so
we experimented with several algorithms, which gave similar
results. The procedure described here is the simplest of those tested.
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Figure 2 Periods of Substantial Reduction in Work-in-Process Inventory1
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dependent variable is labor productivity, and each
firm has a separate constant term that captures the
differences in firm-specific factors. We also included
time dummies in the regression to allow for annual
changes in average industry productivity. The remain-
ing explanatory variables are the WIP/sales ratio and
the level of capital investment per worker, where the
latter serves primarily as a control measure.9
The estimates are shown in Table 4. The error terms
in this regression model are serially correlated; to
correct, we used a first-order autoregressive adjust-
ment. The WIP/sales coefficient appears highly signif-
icant and its magnitude (approximately 20.07) im-
plies that a 10% reduction in WIP was associated with
nearly a 1% increase in productivity, other things
equal. Tests showed that the coefficient was consistent
across time periods and did not differ significantly
between assemblers and suppliers or among the kei-
retsu company groups.10
The estimates in Table 4 show that higher capital
investment per worker had a significant effect on labor
productivity, as expected. The coefficients suggest that
each 10% increase in per capita investment led to
about a 1% to 2% gain in labor productivity.
One concern in this regression model is the potential
for spurious correlation or simultaneity bias in the
WIP/sales coefficients. For example, an unanticipated
decline in sales could lead to a rise in the WIP/sales
ratio as well as a decline in productivity. To check the
possibility of bias, we estimated the equation using
instrumental variables. This led to no change in the
resulting coefficient estimates, although the standard
errors increased slightly due to the reduced efficiency
of the estimator.
6. “Causality” Tests
While the findings of the previous sections reveal an
association between WIP and productivity, they
give little information on the causal relations out-
lined in Figure 1. A deeper assessment requires the
application of methods that can shed light on the
time structure of the inventory-productivity inter-
action. In this section we report tests of “Granger
causality,” an approach commonly used in the
econometrics literature to explore the nature of
causation between two time-series variables (Gran-
ger 1969, Pierce and Haugh 1977, Bishop 1979,
Geweke et al. 1983, Berndt 1991). Such tests deter-
mine whether lagged information on a variable X
has any role in explaining Y t, after controlling for
lagged Y and other factors. While these tests can
establish precedence relations among variables that
interact over time, they cannot demonstrate that
these effects are causal in the conventional sense.
The theoretical model represented by Figure 1
implies that reductions in WIP may stimulate pro-
ductivity gains (links 1, 2, and 5); and conversely,
problem solving activities, which lead to productiv-
ity improvement, may feed back to reduce the level
of WIP inventory (links 2, 3, and 4). Given that the
anticipated relations between WIP and productivity
go in both directions, we estimate two related
regression models.
Effects of WIP Reduction on Labor Productivity
We first examined whether lagged and contempora-
neous changes in WIP inventory have any ability to
9 We used the inventory ratio for the end of the observation year.
The level of fixed investment is for the beginning of the year,
reflecting plant and equipment that was in place for the full year. All
variables were taken in logarithms, which allow the regression
coefficients to be interpreted as elasticities.
10 The coefficient for the Nissan companies was about half the
magnitude shown for the full sample, but the difference was not
statistically significant. When the sample was limited to the period
after 1970, as in the regressions reported in the next section, the
coefficient for the contract assemblers fell significantly below that of
other firms. One explanation is that the contract assemblers made
most of their inventory reductions prior to 1970.
Table 3 Tests for Productivity Changes During Periods of Substantial
Inventory Reduction
Total number of suppliers in sample 41 41
Minimum requirement for “substantial inventory reduction”
(per annum reduction over 6 year period) 4% 8%
Number of suppliers exhibiting “substantial inventory
reduction” 35 33
Number whose productivity rank increased 25 26
Number whose productivity rank decreased 10 7
P-value (binomial test) .01 .001
Differential productivity growth rate (average, per annum,
during inventory reduction period) 1.51% 1.98%
P-value (t-test) .01 .001
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explain changes in labor productivity, after controlling
for lagged productivity and changes in sales. The
regression equation is:
DVt 5 a 1 O
i51
4
b iDVt2i 1 O
i50
4
g iDSt2i
1 O
i50
4
h iDWt2i 1 O
i50
4
l iDKt2i 1 « t, (1)
where
DV t is value-added per employee in year t, divided
by value-added per employee in year t 2 1;
DS t is sales in year t, divided by sales in year t 2 1;
DW t is WIP inventory at the end of year t, divided
by WIP at the end of year t 2 1;
DK t is fixed investment per employee at the end of
year t, divided by investment per employee at the end
of year t 2 1; and « t is a random error term.
All variables were measured in logarithms, which
allows the coefficients to be interpreted in terms of
growth rates. We include lags through year t 2 4,
given that all coefficients became insignificant by the
fourth year. To accommodate this lag structure, the
dependent variable starts in 1970 for most firms.
Equation 1 can be viewed as a forecasting equation.
Changes in labor productivity for a given firm can be
predicted given information on the firm’s historical
productivity trend and the current and lagged growth
of sales. The question posed by the “causality” test is
whether this forecast can be significantly improved
using additional information on changes in WIP in-
ventory.
More formally, one would expect a firm’s current
productivity growth, DV t, to be largely determined by
its lagged productivity (DV t2i) and by short-term
fluctuations in sales (DS t2i), the latter being typically
beyond the control of the firm. The main hypothesis to
be tested is whether, after inclusion of these two series
in the regression equation, changes in WIP inventory
(DW t2i) have a detectable impact on productivity (i.e.,
the h i terms in Equation 1 are jointly significant).
Moreover, one would expect the coefficients for h i to
be negative, assuming that reductions in inventory
contribute to an increase in labor productivity.
Equation 1 also incorporates a test for the produc-
tivity effects of increasing capital investment per
worker (DK t2i). The l i coefficients should be positive,
assuming that investment leads to higher labor pro-
ductivity. These coefficients may also reveal a gesta-
Table 4 Regression Analysis of Labor Productivity
Dependent Variable: Value-added per Employee
Estimation method*
4.1
OLS
4.2
AR1
4.3
AR1
4.4
AR1
4.5
IV
Time dummies yes yes yes yes yes
Firm dummies yes yes yes no yes
Investment per Employee 0.290
(16.4)
0.139
(5.9)
0.148
(6.3)
0.132
(5.8)
0.250
(13.4)
WIP/Sales ratio 20.068
(26.3)
20.068
(25.8)
20.061
(25.6)
20.071
(23.7)
R-squared 0.968 — — — 0.960
SSR 16.11 9.00 9.26 9.76 11.74
D.W. 0.65 1.9 1.88 2.05 0.72
Rho — 0.721 0.719 0.887 —
Number of observations 1265 1265 1265 1265 1265
* Estimation methods are: Ordinary Least Squares (OLS), Maximum Likelihood First-Order
Autoregressive (AR1), and Instrumental Variables (IV). For IV, the instruments include all the
explanatory variable except for WIP/Sales, plus lagged values of investment per employee, number
of employees, and WIP/Sales. (Latter measure lagged two years or more.)
Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics.
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tion lag for new investment to become effective, as
documented previously by Chew et al. (1990, 1991).
Determinants of Changes in WIP Inventory
Our second regression equation tests for the potential
feedback of successful problem solving on the level of
inventory holdings (i.e., links 2, 3, and 4 in Figure 1):
DWt 5 a 1 O
i51
4
b iDWt2i 1 O
i50
4
g iDSt2i
1 O
i50
4
h iDVt2i 1 O
i50
4
l iDKt2i 1 « t, (2)
where the variables are defined as above. In this
equation, changes in WIP inventory (DW t) are as-
sumed to be determined by lagged inventory changes
(DW t2i) and changes in sales (DS t2i). The primary test
of interest is whether reductions in WIP are preceded
by productivity gains (i.e., the h i terms in Equation 2
are negative and significant). Moreover, it is possible
that new investment may disrupt the manufacturing
process in the short term, leading to some increase in
the need for WIP (i.e., positive coefficients for l i).
Given the system of simultaneous relationships
represented by Equations 1 and 2, estimation by
ordinary least squares may lead to biased estimates of
the coefficients. In particular, DW t and DV t are endog-
enous. To avoid erroneous estimates, the potential
simultaneity bias must be tested and, if necessary,
corrected.
Regression Analysis of Annual Changes in Labor
Productivity
Estimates of Equation 1 are reported in Tables 5a and
5b. The first three regressions cover the full sample of
52 companies; all remaining regressions are for groups
of firms as indicated. The OLS estimates were found to
be free of simultaneity bias, based on a Hausman
test.11 However, the error terms were found to be
heteroskedastic; as a correction, we report t-statistics
based on heteroskedastic-consistent (robust) standard
errors.
The regressions in Table 5a show that, as expected,
productivity was strongly influenced by contempora-
neous changes in sales, DS t. Moreover, they show that
after controlling for sales and productivity trends,
changes in WIP inventory preceded changes in pro-
ductivity.12 In the regressions for the full sample (5.2
and 5.3), the DW t21 coefficients are negative and
highly significant, implying that inventory reductions
were followed by productivity gains, with a lag of
about one year. The DW t and DW t22 coefficients are
negative but smaller in magnitude, denoting some
productivity gains in the year of inventory reduction
and two years after. The DW t23 and DW t24 coefficients
are insignificant, indicating the absence of further
impact after two years. The total effect is given by the
sum of the DW t coefficients, which is about 20.10.
This implies that a 10% reduction in WIP inventory
contributed to about a 1% increase in productivity on
average across the sample.
Regression 5.3 includes the DK terms, which cap-
ture the productivity effects of changes in investment
per worker. The DK coefficients, which are jointly
significant, suggest a gestation lag of one or two years
for new investment to become effective. The coeffi-
cients sum to about 0.20, which implies that a 10%
increase in capital per worker led ultimately to about
a 2% increase in labor productivity. The addition of
these controls for capital investment has no apprecia-
ble effect on the WIP coefficients.
We performed tests to determine whether the effects
of WIP reduction were consistent across the company
groupings. In Table 5a the sample is broken down into
assemblers and suppliers; in Table 5b the sample is
divided into three groups: (1) Toyota affiliates, (2)
Nissan affiliates, and (3) “Others.”
Some minor differences between assemblers and
suppliers are shown in Table 5a. There is evidence that
the assemblers had a slightly longer gestation lag
between inventory reduction and productivity gains.
Their DW coefficients remain significant into the
11 We applied the following Hausman test for simultaneity bias
(Berndt 1991, pp. 379–380): Fitted values of DW t were obtained from
reduced form regressions on the exogenous and predetermined
variables, and these values were added as explanatory variables in
equations 5.2 and 5.3. The fitted values were not significant in these
regressions, indicating that the hypothesis of simultaneity bias in
the DW t coefficients can be rejected.
12 The DW coefficients are jointly significant at the 0.001 level based
on an F test or Wald test.
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Table 5a Regression Analysis of Annual Productivity Changes
Dependent variable: DV(t ) 5 growth in labor productivity
All Firms All Assemblers All Suppliers
5.1 5.2 5.3 5.4 5.5 5.6 5.7
a 0.02**
(3.88)
0.02**
(3.70)
0.01
(1.29)
0.02
(0.98)
0.01
(0.54)
0.02**
(3.98)
0.01
(1.45)
DV(21) 0.02
(0.39)
0.01
(0.17)
20.02
(20.37)
20.10
(20.73)
20.11
(20.79)
0.04
(0.67)
0.00
(0.01)
DV(22) 20.18**
(24.21)
20.17**
(24.12)
20.19**
(24.38)
20.24*
(22.24)
20.23*
(22.05)
20.15**
(23.25)
20.17**
(23.75)
DV(23) 0.04
(1.16)
0.04
(1.11)
0.01
(0.41)
20.02
(20.26)
20.05
(20.69)
0.05
(1.48)
0.03
(0.90)
DV(24) 20.01
(20.35)
20.01
(20.37)
20.01
(20.69)
20.02
(20.74)
20.03
(21.09)
20.02
(20.67)
20.02
(20.84)
DS 0.67**
(21.03)
0.68**
(20.09)
0.69**
(20.41)
0.92**
(12.41)
0.94**
(12.45)
0.62**
(16.35)
0.63**
(16.72)
DS(21) 20.14**
(22.68)
20.09
(21.59)
20.07
(21.34)
20.05
(20.40)
20.02
(20.19)
20.09
(21.42)
20.07
(21.26)
DS(22) 0.09*
(2.41)
0.09*
(2.28)
0.08
(2.04)
0.08
(0.80)
0.06
(0.57)
0.08
(1.69)
0.07
(1.51)
DS(23) 20.04
(21.16)
20.04
(21.20)
20.04
(21.10)
20.06
(20.77)
20.05
(20.64)
20.03
(20.92)
20.03
(20.86)
DS(24) 0.00
(0.11)
0.01
(0.50)
0.01
(0.44)
0.04
(0.58)
0.05
(0.74)
0.01
(0.27)
0.01
(0.20)
DW 20.02
(21.60)
20.02
(21.78)
0.00
(20.01)
0.00
(0.22)
20.02
(21.31)
20.02
(21.62)
DW(21) 20.06**
(24.68)
20.07**
(25.26)
20.06**
(23.28)
20.07**
(23.53)
20.06**
(23.70)
20.07**
(24.18)
DW(22) 20.01
(20.88)
20.01
(21.31)
20.06**
(22.93)
20.06**
(23.27)
0.00
(0.25)
0.00
(20.08)
DW(23) 0.01
(0.52)
0.00
(0.42)
20.04
(21.72)
20.03
(21.56)
0.01
(0.92)
0.01
(0.81)
DW(24) 0.00
(0.00)
0.00
(0.22)
0.00
(0.00)
20.03
(21.34)
0.00
(0.00)
0.01
(1.11)
DK 0.03
(1.15)
20.01
(20.15)
0.04
(1.52)
DK(21) 0.11**
(3.91)
0.15*
(2.46)
0.10**
(3.37)
DK(22) 0.06**
(2.85)
20.01
(20.08)
0.06**
(2.80)
DK(23) 0.02
(1.10)
20.03
(20.50)
0.03
(1.32)
DK(24) 0.00
(20.20)
20.03
(20.44)
20.01
(20.34)
R-squared 0.437 0.458 0.476 0.520 0.534 0.466 0.488
SSR 5.907 5.685 5.498 1.628 1.581 3.786 3.630
logL 1326 1347 1366 259 262 1125 1144
D.W. 2.00 2.00 1.97 1.99 1.99 2.00 1.97
Nr. of obs. 1107 1107 1107 240 240 867 867
Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics.
* Significant at the 5% level, two-tailed test.
** Significant at the 1% level, two-tailed test.
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Table 5b Regression Analysis of Annual Productivity Changes
Dependent variable: DV(t ) 5 growth in labor productivity
Toyota Group Nissan Group Others
5.8 5.9 5.10 5.11 5.12 5.13
a 0.03**
(3.16)
0.02
(1.95)
0.03**
(2.68)
0.02*
(1.99)
0.02**
(2.47)
0.00
(0.46)
DV(21) 20.05
(20.81)
20.08
(21.14)
0.09
(1.19)
0.06
(0.85)
20.01
(20.08)
20.04
(20.46)
DV(22) 20.14*
(22.05)
20.15*
(22.38)
20.21**
(22.61)
20.20*
(22.50)
20.16*
(22.51)
20.18**
(22.71)
DV(23) 0.00
(0.04)
20.02
(20.28)
0.04
(0.61)
0.03
(0.36)
0.04
(0.80)
0.00
(0.09)
DV(24) 0.02
(0.92)
0.01
(0.56)
20.01
(20.46)
20.01
(20.50)
20.01
(20.18)
20.01
(20.26)
DS 0.62**
(8.75)
0.62**
(8.55)
0.61**
(10.75)
0.61**
(10.43)
0.70**
(14.50)
0.72**
(15.40)
DS(21) 20.15*
(22.39)
20.12
(21.78)
20.26**
(23.95)
20.25**
(23.92)
0.01
(0.17)
0.02
(0.32)
DS(22) 0.12*
(2.00)
0.10
(1.66)
0.14
(1.80)
0.11
(1.47)
0.04
(0.63)
0.04
(0.63)
DS(23) 20.07
(21.19)
20.08
(21.22)
0.03
(0.56)
0.02
(0.36)
20.07
(21.33)
20.05
(20.89)
DS(24) 0.05
(1.06)
0.04
(0.89)
0.00
(20.07)
0.00
(0.07)
20.01
(20.33)
20.02
(20.45)
DW 20.05**
(23.56)
20.06**
(23.63)
20.01
(20.71)
20.01
(20.25)
0.00
(0.08)
0.00
(20.24)
DW(21) 20.06**
(23.63)
20.06**
(23.75)
0.00
(20.12)
0.00
(0.00)
20.09*
(24.24)
20.10**
(24.66)
DW(22) 20.02
(21.19)
20.03
(21.48)
0.04*
(2.08)
0.02
(1.15)
20.03
(21.35)
20.03
(21.54)
DW(23) 0.00
(20.17)
0.00
(20.10)
20.01
(20.43)
20.02
(20.84)
0.02
(1.22)
0.02
(1.09)
DW(24) 0.00
(0.00)
0.00
(0.22)
0.00
(0.00)
0.01
(0.69)
0.00
(0.00)
0.00
(0.19)
DK 20.02
(20.41)
20.03
(20.54)
0.09*
(2.32)
DK(21) 0.06
(1.06)
0.05
(0.93)
0.12**
(3.40)
DK(22) 0.09*
(2.22)
0.11**
(2.60)
0.02
(0.58)
DK(23) 0.04
(1.17)
0.03
(0.64)
0.02
(0.70)
DK(24) 0.02
(0.37)
20.03
(20.86)
20.02
(20.50)
R-squared 0.422 0.446 0.501 0.523 0.504 0.527
SSR 0.983 0.943 1.080 1.032 3.287 3.132
logL 419 425 346 352 632 646
D.W. 2.00 1.99 1.95 1.93 1.97 1.96
Nr. of obs. 293 293 261 261 553 553
Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics.
* Significant at the 5% level, two-tailed test.
** Significant at the 1% level, two-tailed test.
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second year, with further possible effects in the third
year. Moreover, the total magnitude of effect (sum of
the coefficients) is larger on average for the assemblers
than for the suppliers. These differences were con-
firmed by tests (shown in Table 6) to determine
whether sets of coefficients differed significantly be-
tween groups.13 The test that compares the set of
DW t2i coefficients between assemblers and suppliers
has a p-value of 0.036, indicating that the hypothesis of
identical coefficients can be rejected at the 5% level.
Table 5b shows larger differences between groups
defined on the basis of company affiliation. Regres-
sions 5.8 and 5.9 suggest that the lag between WIP
reduction and productivity gain was about six months
shorter for the Toyota group than for other companies.
Moreover, Regressions 5.10 and 5.11, which are lim-
ited to the Nissan affiliates, reveal that these firms had
no significant productivity gains following reductions
in WIP. These differences among company groups are
confirmed by the test statistics in Table 6.14 The
contrast between Toyota and Nissan groups is consis-
tent with differences in the operations practices of the
two assemblers, as discussed by Cusumano (1985).
These results are depicted graphically in Figure 3,
which plots the cumulative impact of WIP reduction
on productivity (obtained by summing the DW coef-
ficients in Table 5b). The Toyota and “other” company
groupings show similar behavior, although the effects
of WIP reduction are more immediate and perhaps
more persistent for the Toyota companies. By compar-
ison, the absence of such effects for the Nissan affili-
ates is striking.
Regression Analysis of Annual Changes in WIP
Tables 7a and 7b give the regression estimates of
Equation 2 on the determinants of inventory
changes.15 While these regressions explain only a
small proportion of the annual fluctuation in WIP, a
number of significant patterns are indicated. The
DW t2i coefficients are generally negative, revealing a
tendency for deviations from trend to return to the
trend level. This pattern is especially strong for the
Toyota group, where most of the inventory adjust-
ment occurred in the first year, much faster than what
is shown for other companies. There was also a strong
tendency—particularly in the case of part suppliers—
for changes in WIP to track recent changes in sales, as
would be expected. The DS t2i coefficients in regres-
sions 7.2 and 7.3 sum to approximately unity, imply-
ing that increases in sales were ultimately met by
13 We implemented these tests by constraining the coefficients of
interest to be identical between the two groups being compared,
while allowing all other coefficients to differ between the groups.
The sum of squared residuals in these constrained regressions,
relative to the unconstrained values shown in Table 5, provides the
basis for the tests. Table 6 gives significance levels obtained using
the Wald test recommended by Geweke et al. (1983).
14 Differences between the Toyota and Nissan groups are significant
at the 5% level, as are the differences between the Toyota group and
“Others.” Differences between the Nissan group and “Others” are
significant at the 1% level.
15 We tested these OLS regressions for simultaneity bias in the DV
coefficients, using a Hausman test analogous to the one described in
footnote 12. Results indicated that the OLS estimates were unbiased.
Although tests showed the absence of significant heteroskedasticity,
we report t-statistics based on heteroskedastic-consistent standard
errors, as in Table 5.
Table 6 Tests of Equality Between Groups*
Assemblers
versus
Suppliers
Toyota Group
versus
Nissan group
Toyota Group
versus
“Other” Group
Nissan Group
versus
“Other” Group
Productivity change following change in WIP
(DW coefficients in Table 5) .036 .013 .027 .001
Change in WIP following change in Productivity
(DV coefficients in Table 7) .259 .001 .000 .113
* Tests were performed by constraining the coefficients indicated (for years t through t 2 3) to be identical between
groups, with all other coefficients allowed to differ. Table gives the p-level by which the null hypothesis of coefficient
equality can be rejected, based on a Wald test. (F-test results were very similar.)
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roughly proportionate increases in WIP.16 Most of this
adjustment occurred in the year that sales increased.
The conceptual framework outlined in §2 implies
that WIP reductions should follow improvements in
productivity, although the lag time for adjustment
may vary. The regressions in Table 7 provide mixed
evidence of such effects. While the DV t2i coefficients
are generally negative, as expected, none of the indi-
vidual terms are statistically significant except in the
regressions for the Toyota group. (The tests in Table 6
confirm that the Toyota group coefficients are signifi-
cantly different from the rest of the sample.) Com-
pared with other companies, the Toyota affiliates
made faster and more consistent reductions in inven-
tory following improvements in the manufacturing
process. Figure 4 illustrates this finding. For the
Toyota companies on average, a 1% productivity gain
was followed within about a year by a 1.7% reduction
in WIP. Other firms also cut their inventories over
time (as indicated by the summary ratios presented
earlier in Table 2), but without such a tight coupling.
The DK t2i coefficients in Table 7 provide additional
information on the determinants of WIP. The coeffi-
cient for capital investments made during the obser-
vation year is strongly positive, implying that WIP
inventories rose in response to new investment. This
may reflect intentional steps to increase inventory
buffers, or alternatively, unanticipated disruption on
the factory floor. For the Toyota- and Nissan-affiliated
companies, this post-investment build up seems to have
dissipated fairly quickly, as indicated by the negative
coefficients for DK t21 and DK t22.
7. Discussion and Perspective
The preceding sections of this paper present various
tests for a connection between WIP inventory and
productivity, based on historical data for the Japanese
automotive sector. In this section we consider the
findings in broader perspective.
All the tests show a strong and statistically signifi-
cant connection between inventory and productivity.
None, however, can fully distinguish among the
causal links shown in Figure 1. As illustrated in the
figure, an association between inventory and produc-
tivity can arise in several ways. One chain of causality
begins with successful problem solving, which leads
to productivity gains (link 2) and subsequent
16 While sales declines occasionally occurred, the predominant trend
was of increasing sales over the sample period.
Figure 3 Productivity Change Following WIP Reduction*
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Table 7a Regression Analysis of Annual Changes in WIP
Dependent variable: DW(t ) 5 change in WIP inventory
All firms All Assemblers All suppliers
7.1 7.2 7.3 7.4 7.5 7.6 7.7
a 20.02
(21.46)
20.01
(20.93)
20.03
(21.77)
0.04
(0.94)
0.04
(0.74)
20.03
(21.62)
20.05**
(22.53)
DW(21) 20.15**
(23.92)
20.16**
(24.20)
20.15**
(24.00)
20.22**
(22.91)
20.21**
(22.63)
20.11*
(22.44)
20.10
(22.32)
DW(22) 20.10**
(22.61)
20.11**
(22.69)
20.10*
(22.41)
20.05
(20.51)
20.03
(20.28)
20.24**
(23.59)
20.13**
(23.51)
DW(23) 20.04
(21.09)
20.04
(21.00)
20.06
(21.52)
20.04
(20.44)
20.05
(20.58)
20.01
(20.17)
20.03
(20.66)
DW(24) 0.03
(0.89)
0.03
(0.77)
0.03
(0.96)
0.14*
(1.98)
0.15*
(2.05)
20.02
(20.53)
20.01
(20.37)
DS 0.69**
(8.84)
0.82**
(6.72)
0.81**
(6.86)
0.37
(1.34)
0.36
(1.28)
0.91**
(6.49)
0.91**
(6.67)
DS(21) 0.04
(0.56)
0.09
(0.80)
0.06
(0.48)
0.08
(0.32)
20.02
(20.06)
0.08
(0.60)
0.05
(0.36)
DS(22) 20.01
(20.11)
20.03
(20.22)
0.03
(0.25)
20.52
(21.51)
20.41
(21.18)
0.08
(0.62)
0.13
(1.03)
DS(23) 0.17*
(2.15)
0.23*
(2.07)
0.22*
(1.98)
0.07
(0.24)
0.05
(0.16)
0.26*
(2.17)
0.26*
(2.11)
DS(24) 0.06
(0.79)
0.05
(0.54)
0.04
(0.43)
20.08
(20.41)
20.06
(20.29)
0.12
(1.23)
0.10
(1.05)
DV 20.19
(21.59)
20.20
(21.75)
0.00
(20.01)
0.04
(0.22)
20.21
(21.30)
20.24
(21.59)
DV(21) 20.09
(20.89)
20.12
(21.10)
0.08
(0.42)
0.08
(0.41)
20.16
(21.27)
20.20
(21.49)
DV(22) 0.01
(0.05)
20.05
(20.46)
0.23
(1.02)
0.15
(0.62)
0.02
(0.13)
20.04
(20.30)
DV(23) 20.09
(20.91)
20.08
(20.86)
0.17
(0.80)
0.22
(1.01)
20.19
(21.66)
20.20
(21.77)
DV(24) 0.00
(0.00)
20.01
(20.14)
0.00
(0.00)
0.23
(1.83)
0.00
(0.00)
20.06
(20.88)
DK 0.32**
(4.42)
0.39
(1.63)
0.30**
(4.23)
DK(21) 20.06
(20.87)
20.25
(21.32)
20.04
(20.53)
DK(22) 20.01
(20.05)
20.14
(20.71)
0.02
(0.14)
DK(23) 0.15*
(2.14)
0.13
(0.64)
0.14*
(2.13)
DK(24) 20.10
(21.54)
20.18
(20.91)
20.05
(20.80)
R-squared 0.123 0.128 0.152 0.147 0.175 0.157 0.182
SSR 56.13 55.82 54.22 14.75 14.26 39.32 38.16
logL 79.7 82.7 98.7 25.8 21.7 110.7 123.7
D.W. 1.99 1.99 2.00 2.07 2.10 1.99 2.00
Nr. of obs. 1107 1107 1107 240 240 867 867
Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics.
* Significant at the 5% level, two-tailed test.
** Significant at the 1% level, two-tailed test.
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Table 7b Regression Analysis of Annual Changes in WIP
Dependent variable: DW(t ) 5 change in WIP inventory
Toyota Group Nissan Group Others
7.8 7.9 7.10 7.11 7.12 7.13
a 0.08*
(2.11)
0.04
(0.98)
20.03
(21.09)
20.04
(21.32)
20.04
(21.83)
20.05
(21.91)
DW(21) 20.27**
(23.58)
20.25**
(23.58)
20.08
(21.13)
20.05
(20.70)
20.13*
(22.42)
20.13*
(22.47)
DW(22) 20.11
(21.43)
20.10
(21.29)
20.05
(20.64)
0.01
(0.13)
20.17**
(23.36)
20.17**
(23.37)
DW(23) 0.01
(0.08)
20.04
(20.65)
20.10
(21.24)
20.11
(21.47)
20.06
(21.34)
20.07
(21.36)
DW(24) 0.11
(1.83)
0.14*
(2.26)
0.04
(0.56)
0.06
(0.89)
20.06
(21.24)
20.06
(21.27)
DS 1.03**
(4.04)
0.95**
(3.86)
0.90**
(3.80)
0.70*
(3.30)
0.63**
(4.01)
0.67**
(4.39)
DS(21) 0.44
(1.48)
0.49
(1.54)
20.29
(21.35)
20.24
(21.20)
0.10
(0.70)
0.09
(0.60)
DS(22) 20.56
(21.59)
20.47
(21.38)
0.12
(0.60)
0.20
(0./95)
0.09
(0.53)
0.11
(0.59)
DS(23) 0.05
(0.18)
20.03
(20.11)
0.23
(1.27)
0.19
(1.02)
0.41*
(2.30)
0.42*
(2.37)
DS(24) 0.08
(0.39)
0.05
(0.29)
20.02
(20.11)
0.00
(0.02)
0.07
(0.60)
0.07
(0.56)
DV 20.84**
(23.50)
20.84**
(23.31)
20.18
(20.74)
20.06
(20.25)
0.01
(0.08)
20.04
(20.24)
DV(21) 20.68*
(22.46)
20.88**
(23.08)
0.28
(1.19)
0.17
(0.82)
20.03
(20.21)
20.04
(20.29)
DV(22) 0.14
(0.62)
0.11
(0.47)
0.15
(0.71)
0.09
(0.41)
20.12
(20.78)
20.14
(20.93)
DV(23) 20.03
(20.16)
20.10
(20.47)
20.29
(21.30)
20.22
(21.04)
20.08
(20.59)
20.10
(20.71)
DV(24) 0.00
(0.00)
0.01
(0.07)
0.00
(0.00)
0.07
(0.95)
0.00
(0.00)
20.06
(20.66)
DK 0.36**
(2.64)
0.53**
(3.40)
0.17
(1.68)
DK(21) 20.27*
(22.10)
20.12
(20.99)
0.06
(0.55)
DK(22) 0.45
(1.34)
20.31*
(22.36)
0.00
(20.04)
DK(23) 0.26
(1.56)
0.34*
(2.49)
0.01
(0.10)
DK(24) 0.04
(0.30)
20.22
(21.50)
20.05
(20.57)
R-squared 0.198 0.266 0.180 0.277 0.156 0.164
SSR 15.18 13.90 12.90 11.37 24.50 24.28
logL 17.9 30.8 22.1 38.5 77.1 79.5
D.W. 1.95 1.97 1.97 1.9 2.04 2.04
Nr. of obs. 293 293 261 261 553 553
Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics.
* Significant at the 5% level, two-tailed test.
** Significant at the 1% level, two-tailed test.
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inventory reduction (links 3 and 4). In this case WIP
reduction plays no role in stimulating productivity,
but is purely a response to successful problem solving.
Could this be the dominant chain of causality under-
lying the empirical results? The tests in §§4 and 5 are
silent on this issue, but the analysis in §6 is informa-
tive. One piece of evidence is the finding of a relatively
weak connection between productivity gains and sub-
sequent inventory reductions, except within the
Toyota group. By comparison, the links in the oppo-
site direction (WIP reductions preceding productivity
gains) appear larger and more pervasive. These pre-
cedence relations suggest that the dominant path
leads from WIP reduction to productivity growth,
rather than vice versa.
Ambiguity nevertheless remains with respect to the
exact mechanisms linking inventory reduction to pro-
ductivity gains. To what extent does it occur via links
1 and 2 (embodying the “rocks in the river” metaphor
for JIT), as opposed to link 5 (inventory reduction
economizes on working capital and other inputs)? We
expect the former to be more important, for a number
of reasons. Schonberger (1982) and others have argued
that the benefits associated with link 5, which are
primarily savings in inventory holding costs, are com-
paratively small. In the Japanese automotive industry
we estimate that these holding cost economies
amounted to at most one-third of the average produc-
tivity gain.17 Moreover, most of the holding cost
savings would be immediate, whereas we typically
observe the productivity gain with a lag.
These assessments are based on the assumption that
the WIP-productivity connection reflects the outcome
of successful problem solving activity. To some extent,
though, the observed correlations could stem from
factory setbacks. Unanticipated problems may cause a
temporary drop in productivity (link 2) and a build-up
of WIP inventory (links 3 and 4). While such effects
may be present in our data, they are likely to be
comparatively small. One reason is that such setbacks
should have an immediate impact on both productiv-
ity and inventory, whereas the analysis shows signif-
17 In our sample, the WIP/value-added ratio peaked at 16.3% in
1967, falling below 10% from 1977 onward. Assuming a 15% ratio
and a 15% annual holding cost, a 10% reduction in WIP amounts to
a holding cost savings equal to 0.225% of value-added. This is less
than one third of the estimated productivity gain.
Figure 4 Change in WIP Following Productivity Gain**
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icant lags. Moreover, in the Japanese automotive in-
dustry the strong prevailing trend was toward WIP
reduction and productivity growth, rather than vice
versa.
One issue that warrants greater discussion is the
precise interpretation of the time structure associated
with the coefficients in the Granger causality tests.
Given that some variables are end-of-year stocks while
others are annual flows, a shift of one-half year is
appropriate in some cases.18 In Table 5, for example,
the lag between WIP reduction and productivity gain
was likely to have been about six months shorter than
what would otherwise be implied by the regression
coefficients. Suitable adjustment suggests that produc-
tivity gains were almost immediate for the Toyota
companies, as compared with a lag of about one-half
year for non-Toyota suppliers, and one year for as-
semblers. In Table 7, the flow variables such as DV are
shifted by six months in the opposite direction. Here,
the coefficients for DV t and DV t21, which are statisti-
cally significant for the Toyota group, should be
interpreted as reflecting lags of 0.5 and 1.5 years
between productivity gains and subsequent inventory
reductions.19
To put the findings in perspective, it is helpful to
compare the magnitude of productivity gains attrib-
utable to inventory reduction with the gains attribut-
able more broadly to other factors. The WIP coeffi-
cients in Tables 4 and 5 suggest that as a rough
approximation, each 10% reduction in WIP contrib-
uted to an average increase of about 1% in labor
productivity. Producers that made substantial inven-
tory reductions (as identified by our algorithm) cut
their WIP/sales ratio by about two-thirds, on average.
Combining these estimates leads to the conclusion
that, for such firms, the aggregate productivity gain
attributable to inventory reductions was typically
about 10%. In other words, labor productivity was
10% higher at the end of the sample period, as
compared with the hypothetical case where the firm
would have made no inventory reductions at all.20
While a 10% productivity differential is appreciable,
it is important to recognize that from 1970 to 1980,
when most of the inventory reductions were occur-
ring, labor productivity for the sample companies
grew at an average annual rate of 9%. Thus, the
estimated effects of inventory reduction correspond to
less than one-tenth of the total productivity gains
recorded during the 1970s.
The cumulative impact of WIP reduction on labor
productivity can also be compared with the effects of
increased capital investment. From 1970 to 1980, real
fixed capital per worker rose by 5.1% per year on
average across the sample. Using an elasticity of 0.15,
which is suggested by the regression coefficients in
Tables 4 and 5, this increase in capital intensity trans-
lates into a labor productivity gain of about 10% over
the course of the decade. Thus, the productivity gain
that can be linked to inventory reduction during the
1970s may have been roughly the same magnitude as
the gain from increased capital investment. Taken
together, these estimates suggest that most of the
rapid growth in Japanese automotive productivity
during the 1970s was derived from manufacturing
process improvements not directly related to capital
investment or inventory reduction.21
18 Assume for purposes of illustration that a reduction in WIP
inventory leads to an immediate gain in productivity. The depen-
dent variable in Table 5, DV t, is the change in value-added per
worker (a flow measure) between year t 2 1 and year t. The
explanatory variable, DW t, is the change in the stock of WIP
inventory, measured from the end of year t 2 1 to the end of year
t. A reduction in WIP made at the midpoint of year t would be
followed by an immediate rise in the firm’s value-added, but the
increase in productivity, a recorded by DV t, would appear half in
year t and half in the next year. In the regression analysis of DV t one
would observe coefficients of equal magnitude for DW t and DW t21,
with coefficients of zero for the additional lagged terms. This is
approximately what is shown for the Toyota group (regressions 5.8
and 5.9).
19 This raises the possibility that DV t11 should be included as an
explanatory variable in Table 7. When tested, this measure had a
negative coefficient that was weakly significant but comparatively
small.
20 A similar computation can be made using the estimates of relative
labor productivity growth in Table 3. Firms that made substantial
inventory reductions (based on the 4% criterion) experienced pro-
ductivity growth during this period that was, on average, about
1.5% above the growth rate of other firms. Multiplying this figure by
an average reduction period of about 6–7 years (consistent with
Figure 2) yields a total differential productivity gain of about 10%.
21 During the 1970s various manufacturing practices, such as quality
circles and total quality control, became widely adopted in the
Japanese automotive sector.
LIEBERMAN AND DEMEESTER
Inventory Reduction and Productivity Growth
Management Science/Vol. 45, No. 4, April 1999 483
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
fro
m
 in
fo
rm
s.o
rg
 b
y 
[2
02
.16
1.4
3.7
7]
 on
 18
 Se
pte
mb
er 
20
17
, a
t 2
3:5
6 .
 Fo
r p
ers
on
al 
us
e o
nly
, a
ll r
igh
ts 
res
erv
ed
. 
8. Conclusions
The findings of this study shed light on the linkages
between WIP inventory and productivity. We have
considered alternate paths of causality and have de-
rived quantitative estimates of effects. The results are
complementary with the large body of case study
evidence on the implementation of JIT manufacturing.
Indeed, our work demonstrates that quantitative anal-
ysis of public company data can provide insights for
researchers and practitioners in operations manage-
ment, a field with little tradition of statistical data
analysis.
Our findings suggest that for most companies in our
sample, inventory reductions were followed by pro-
ductivity gains. We find more limited evidence of
effects in the opposite direction. In quantitative terms,
each 10% reduction in inventory led to an average
gain of about 1% in labor productivity, with a lag of
about one year. Firms that made substantial inventory
reductions enjoyed a period of annual productivity
growth significantly higher than that of other compa-
nies on average. Typically, these firms also saw an
increase in their productivity rank.
While these effects were widespread in the Japanese
auto industry, inter-firm differences are apparent, par-
ticularly between the Toyota and Nissan groups. For the
firms affiliated with Toyota the inventory-productivity
linkage appears very tight: productivity gains followed
quickly after inventory reductions, and inventories were
cut soon after the achievement of productivity gains. For
the Nissan affiliates, however, neither of these effects
was observed. “Other” companies in our sample
showed a significant link in one direction only (from
inventory to productivity), and with a longer lag than
that detected for the Toyota group. Despite these differ-
ences in estimated effects, over the two decades of
sample coverage most of the companies in the sample
achieved major inventory reductions, and all attained
substantial productivity growth. Taken jointly, these
observations support our hypothesis that many Japanese
firms relied on inventory reduction as a driver for
process improvement, although some utilized other ap-
proaches and methods.
While broadly consistent with prior research, these
findings offer new and quantitative insights regarding
the effects of JIT implementation. Nevertheless, im-
portant caveats apply. The findings presented here are
aggregate estimates, far removed from details of the
shop floor where JIT implementation actually takes
place. Such details undoubtedly matter, and the esti-
mates obtained in this study are averages that mask
heterogeneity across individual firms, plants and pro-
cesses.
Most importantly, it is well known that inventory
reduction is only one component of JIT; related activ-
ities (such as setup time reduction and statistical
process control) are essential. It may be impossible,
and perhaps not meaningful, to distinguish the impact
of WIP reduction from that of these other activities.
Indeed, the WIP reductions observed in this study
may serve in part as a proxy for these other activities,
with which they are correlated. Thus, the quantitative
findings of this study should be kept in perspective
and regarded as rough benchmarks only.22
22 The authors are grateful for financial support from the Interna-
tional Motor Vehicle Program, the Institute for International Eco-
nomic Studies, and the UCLA Center for International Business
Education and Research. The Daiwa Securities Corporation and the
Japan Development Bank provided access to data. The authors
thank Hau Lee, the associate editor, and two referees for helpful
comments.
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